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home members’ Bluetooth devices, because they always store and transmit personal sensitive 
information. In the Bluetooth standard, Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) is an essential security 
mechanism for Bluetooth devices. We examine the security of SSP in the recent Bluetooth 
standard V5.0. The passkey entry association model in SSP is analyzed under the man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks. Our contribution is twofold. (1) We demonstrate that the passkey entry 
association model is vulnerable to the MITM attack, once the host reuses the passkey. (2) An 
improved passkey entry protocol is therefore designed to fix the reusing passkey defect in the 
passkey entry association model. The improved passkey entry protocol can be easily adapted to the 
Bluetooth standard, because it only uses the basic cryptographic components existed in the 
Bluetooth standard. Our research results are beneficial to the security enhancement of Bluetooth 
devices in the home network systems. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Fig. 1 Bluetooth security for the home network system 
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The Bluetooth technology [1] enables universal short-range and low-power wireless 
connectivity among the Bluetooth devices. Nowadays, Bluetooth modules are integrated 
in most smartphones, wireless headsets, and laptops. It is not surprising that the 
Bluetooth technology is the footstone of the home network systems. 
In practice, the security solutions are necessary to protect the Bluetooth applications 
[2–8] due to the ubiquitousness of the Bluetooth devices. For a typical home network 
system, the security overview for Bluetooth devices and their network is described as Fig. 
1. 
The Bluetooth network is not a traditional IP-based network. Hence, IP-based 
canonical security solutions, such as IPSec and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), are not 
supported by the Bluetooth network. Nevertheless, to guarantee Bluetooth devices and 
their network in a secure manner, the Bluetooth standard [9, 10] specially provides a set 
of the exchanging key, authentication, and confidentiality mechanisms. 
1.1 Architecture of Bluetooth security 
The Bluetooth standard [10] specifies four security modes called security modes 1 
through 4. A Bluetooth device possibly supports one or multiple (not all) security modes. 
Security modes 2 and 4 are the service level enforced security, where security procedures 
are initiated after physical and logical link setup. Comparatively, security mode 3 is 
designed for the link level enforced security. That is, a device initiates security 
procedures, before the physical link is fully established. Security modes 1, 2, and 3 are 
the legacy security modes and apply to those devices with a controller or a host that does 
not support security mode 4. Additionally, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) [11] recommends security mode 4, because it requires the secure 
connections, which use Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) and Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES). 
From the security view, SSP is the foundation of security mode 4. The crucial task of 
SSP is to establish the link key between two Bluetooth devices. In fact, the link key 
dominates the security of the Bluetooth network system, because other security 
procedures all require depending on the link key to achieve their security goals. During 
establishing the link key, SSP uses the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) public key 
algorithm as a means to thwart passive eavesdropping attacks. However, the ECDH 
public key algorithm in SSP may be subject to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks 
because of the lack of PKI in the Bluetooth network system. To address MITM attacks, 
the four association models offered in SSP are as follows. 
(1) Numeric comparison is designed for the case, where a user is shown a 6-digit 
number on the display of each pairing device and provides a “yes” or “no” response 
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according to whether the numbers match. Each device in sight of the user independently 
computes the 6-digit number. Hence, the MITM attacker fails due to the unmatched 6-
digit numbers. 
(2) Passkey entry is primarily designed for the case, where one device has input 
capability but does not have the capability to display 6 digits and the other device has 
input and (or) output capabilities. To defeat MITM attacks, a 6-digit number called the 
passkey need be inputted into one or two devices. 
(3) Out of Band (OOB) is designed for devices that support an additional wireless, e.g., 
Near Field Communication (NFC), or wired technology. This model prevents MITM 
attacks, because it assumes that the attacker cannot compromise two communication 
channels simultaneously. 
(4) Just works is designed for the case, where at least one of the pairing devices has 
neither a display nor a keyboard for entering digits, e.g., headset. This model provides no 
MITM protection. 
1.2 Previous work on Secure Simple Pairing 
Chang and Shmatikov [12] used the formal method tool to analyze the numeric 
comparison association model in SSP and found that the authentication fails if the same 
device is used parallel in different sessions. Suomalainen et al. [13] pointed out a 
potential attack scenario, where the security of the device with a more IO (Input and 
Output) capability is compromised by interacted with another device of restricted IO 
capability. Lindell [14] proved that the numeric comparison association model in the 
Bluetooth standard V2.1 is secure under the appropriate security model. Haataja and 
Toivanen [15, 16] proposed the MITM attacks and the countermeasures for the numeric 
comparison and OOB association models. The proposed MITM attacks exploit the 
falsification of information sent during the IO capabilities exchange and the fact that the 
security of SSP is likely to be limited by the capabilities of the least powerful or the least 
secure device type. Phan and Mingard [17] mainly analyzed the numeric comparison, 
passkey entry, and OOB association models using the MITM attacks, providing that one 
device is malicious. Barnickel et al. [18] explored a MITM attack on the passkey entry 
association model, when the attacker prevents the pairing process to successfully 
complete and the user inputs the same passkey twice. Albahar et al. [19–21] presented 
some countermeasures for SSP to prevent MITM attacks such as using new precautionary 
steps in the just works association model and building the virtual channel. Gajbhiye et al. 
[22] presented the simulation and the security analysis of the numeric comparison 
association model in the network simulator NS2. 
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1.3 Our contribution 
We examine the security of SSP in security mode 4 in the recent Bluetooth standard 
specifications, i.e., the Bluetooth standard V5.0 [10]. The passkey entry association 
model in SSP is reevaluated under the MITM attacks. Our contribution is twofold. (1) We 
demonstrate that the passkey entry association model is vulnerable to the MITM attack, 
once the host reuses the passkey. (2) An improved passkey entry protocol is therefore 
designed to fix the reusing passkey problem under the passkey entry association model. 
Moreover, the implementation cost of the improved passkey entry protocol only has an 
insignificant increase, compared with the original protocol. 
2 Review of Secure Simple Pairing 
Fig. 2 Flow chart of Secure Simple Pairing 
 
As shown in Fig. 2, SSP consists of 5 phases, i.e., public key exchange (Phase 1), 
authentication stage 1 (Phase 2), authentication stage 2 (Phase 3), link key calculation 
(Phase 4), and Link Manager Protocol (LMP) authentication and encryption (Phase 5). 
Phases 1, 3, 4, and 5 are the same for all association models. However, authentication 
stage 1 is different depending on the association model used. Before the description of 5 
Phase 1 (step 1): public key exchange 
Phase 2 (steps 2-8): authentication stage 1 
Phase 3 (steps 9-11): authentication stage 2 
Phase 4 (step 12): link key calculation 




phases in SSP, we firstly introduce the terminology used throughout this paper. For 
discussion convenience, we almost abide by the same symbols as in the Bluetooth 
standard [10]. 
Cryptographic key 
PKx: ECDH public key of Bluetooth device X or attacker X. 
SKx: ECDH secret (private) key of Bluetooth device X or attacker X. 
LK, LK1, and LK2: link keys established by Bluetooth devices. 
DHkey, DHkey1, and DHkey2: Diffie-Hellman keys. 
Constant parameter 
BD_ADDRx: unique address of Bluetooth device X. 
X: unique address of Bluetooth device X, when it appears in cryptographic function. 
IOcapX: IO capabilities of Bluetooth device X. 
btlk: a predefined bit string. 
Variable parameter 
Nx: nonce (unique random value) from Bluetooth device X or attacker X. 
Nxi: ith nonce (unique random value) from Bluetooth device X or attacker X. 
rx: random value of Bluetooth device X, i.e., the passkey. 
rxi: ith bit of the rx. 
r*x: random image of the rx. 
r*xi: ith bit of the r*x. 
Cxi: ith commitment value from Bluetooth device X. 
C′xi: ith counterfeit commitment value of Bluetooth device X from the attacker. 
Ex: check value from Bluetooth device X. 
E′x: counterfeit check value of Bluetooth device X from the attacker. 
Cryptographic hash function 
f1(): used to generate and verify the Cxi and the C′xi. 
f2(): used to generate the link key and possible other keys from the Diffie-Hellman 
key. 
f3(): used to generate and verify the Ex and the E′x in authentication stage 2. 
Figure 3 describes 5 phases of SSP under the passkey entry association model. Each 
Bluetooth device need generate its own ECDH public-private key pair. Here, the key pair 
can be generated only once per device and may be computed in advance of the pairing 
procedure. Alternatively, a device may, at any time, discard its public-private key pair 
and generate a new one instead. We further explain those phases in the following. 
2.1 Phase 1: public key exchange 
The public key exchange phase is given as follows. 
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Fig. 3 Secure Simple Pairing under the passkey entry association model 
 
The initiating device A and the responding device B respectively exchange the PKa 








1c. Start computing DHkey 
DHkey=P256(SKa, PKb) or DHkey=P192(SKa, PKb) 
1d. Start computing DHkey 





9a. Compute Ea=f3(DHkey, Na, Nb, rb, IOcapA, A, B) 9b. Compute Eb=f3(DHkey, Nb, Na, ra, IOcapB, B, A) 
10a. Check Ea=f3(DHkey, Na, Nb, rb, IOcapA, A, B) 
If check fails, abort 
11a. Check Eb=f3(DHkey, Nb, Na, ra, IOcapB, B, A) 
If check fails, abort 
Phase 4 
12a. Compute LK=f2(DHkey, Na, Nb, btlk, 
BD_ADDRa, BD_ADDRb) 







7a. Check if Cai=f1(PKax, PKbx, Nai, rbi) 
If check fails, abort 
2a. Inject secret ra; Set rb=ra 2b. Inject secret rb; Set ra=rb 
3a. Select random Nai 3b. Select random Nbi 
Steps 3-8 execute 20 times 





4a. Compute commitment: Cai=f1(PKax, PKbx, Nai, rai) 
Host 
4b. Compute commitment: Cbi=f1(PKbx, PKax, Nbi, rbi) 
8a. Check if Cbi=f1(PKbx, PKax, Nbi, rai) 
If check fails, abort 
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Diffie-Hellman function P256(SKa, PKb) or P192(SKa, PKb) (step 1c in Fig. 3). In other 
side, the B computes the shared DHkey by the Diffie-Hellman function P256(SKb, PKa) 
or P192(SKb, PKa) (step 1d in Fig. 3). Herein, if both devices’ controllers and hosts 
support secure connections, the function P256() is used. Otherwise, the function P192() is 
used. 
2.2 Phase 2: authentication stage 1 
Authentication stage 1 has three different protocols for the corresponding association 
models, i.e., the numeric comparison protocol, the OOB protocol, and the passkey entry 
protocol. The just works association model makes use of the numeric comparison 
protocol. The detail protocol is chosen based on the IO capabilities of the pairing devices. 
In this section, the passkey entry protocol is reviewed, because we address the 
weaknesses on it. The host in Fig. 3 is treated as a user or a device function. 
The user inputs an identical passkey ra(=rb) into both devices (step 2a and step 2b in 
Fig. 3). Alternately, the passkey may be generated and displayed on one device, and then 
the user inputs it into the other (also step 2a and step 2b in Fig. 3). This shared passkey 
with the 20-bit length is the basis of the mutual authentication of two devices. Steps 3 
through 8 are repeated 20 rounds using each bit of the passkey. In the ith round for 
1≤i≤20, the device A and the device B perform the following steps. 
The A and the B respectively generate the random Nai and the random Nbi (step 3a 
and step 3b in Fig. 3). Then, the A and the B further commit to their ith bit of the passkey 
by computing Cai=f1(PKax, PKbx, Nai, rai) and Cbi=f1(PKbx, PKax, Nbi, rbi) (step 4a 
and step 4b in Fig. 3). Here, the PKax and the PKbx respectively denote the x-coordinates 
of the PKa and the PKb. Then, both devices exchange the Cai and the Cbi (step 5 and step 
6 in Fig. 3). Next, the A sends its Nai to the B (step 7 in Fig. 3). Upon receiving the Nai, 
the B checks whether Cai=f1(PKax, PKbx, Nai, rbi). If it fails, the B terminates the run of 
the protocol (step 7a in Fig. 3). Otherwise, the B also sends its Nbi to the A (step 8 in Fig. 
3). Upon receiving the Nbi, the A checks whether Cbi=f1(PKbx, PKax, Nbi, rai). If it 
fails, the A terminates the run of protocol (step 8a in Fig. 3). 
Note that at the end of this stage, the A and the B all set Na=Na20 and Nb=Nb20 for 
use in authentication stage 2. 
2.3 Phase 3: authentication stage 2 
The device A and the device B have successfully completed the message exchange, if 
they pass the second stage of the authentication. We depict this authentication stage as 
follows. 
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The A and the B respectively compute Ea=f3(DHkey, Na, Nb, rb, IOcapA, A, B) and 
Eb=f3(DHkey, Nb, Na, ra, IOcapB, B, A) as confirmation values (step 9a and step 9b in 
Fig. 3). The A then transmits its Ea to the B (step 10 in Fig. 3). Upon receiving the Ea, 
the B checks whether Ea=f3(DHkey, Na, Nb, rb, IOcapA, A, B). If this check fails, it 
indicates that the A has not confirmed the pairing and the run of the protocol should abort 
(step 10a in Fig. 3). The B then transmits its Eb to the A (step 11 in Fig. 3). Upon 
receiving the Eb, the A similarly checks whether Eb=f3(DHkey, Nb, Na, ra, IOcapB, B, 
A). A failure indicates that the B has not confirmed the pairing and the run of the protocol 
should abort (step 11a in Fig. 3). 
2.4 Phase 4: link key calculation 
Once both devices have confirmed the pairing, a shared LK is respectively computed by 
f2(DHkey, Na, Nb, btlk, BD_ADDRa, BD_ADDRb) (step 12a and step 12b in Fig. 3). 
2.5 Phase 5: LMP authentication and encryption 
This phase consists of the authentication process and the encryption key generation 
process, which all base the LK. It is actually the same as the final steps in the pairing of 
the legacy security modes. The technique details of Phase 5 are omitted, because our 
research does not focus on them. 
3 Vulnerabilities on Secure Simple Pairing 
When SSP is under the passkey entry association model, the passkey ra(=rb) is the only 
secret used to prevent MITM attacks. Clearly, if the attacker knows the ra before the run 
of the passkey entry protocol, he can launch the MITM attack as Fig. 4. According to the 
passkey entry protocol, the passkey is generated and displayed by the Bluetooth device or 
chosen and inputted by the user. According to the Bluetooth standard [10], the passkey 
generation algorithm is not provided for the device. Hence, the device possibly operates 
the nonrandom passkey generation algorithm or simply reuses the passkey. The attacker 
is able to launch the MITM attack in Fig. 4, once he correctly predicts the ra displayed by 
the device. On the other hand, many users are inclined to choose the same passkey in a 
period of time, because it is convenient to them. In the following, we depend on this fact 
to compromise the passkey. Clearly, it leads to the MITM attack on the passkey entry 
association model as Fig. 4, when the compromised passkey is used again. 
3.1 Offline attack on passkey 
The attacker E can perform the following steps to derive the used ra. 
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Fig. 4 MITM attack on the passkey entry association model 
1b′. PKe 1b. PKb 





1c. Start computing Diffie-Hellman key 
DHkey1=P256(SKa, PKe) or 
DHkey1=P192(SKa, PKe) 
 
1d. Start computing Diffie-Hellman key 





1c′. Start computing Diffie-Hellman keys 
DHkey1=P256(SKe, PKa) and  
DHkey2=P256(SKe, PKb) or 
DHkey1=P192(SKe, PKa) and 
DHkey2=P192(SKe, PKb) 





9a. Compute Ea=f3(DHkey1, Na, 
Nb=Ne20, rb, IOcapA, A, B) 
9b. Compute Eb=f3(DHkey2, Nb, 
Na=Ne20, ra, IOcapB, B, A) 
10a. Check 
E′a=f3(DHkey2, Na=Ne20, Nb, rb, IOcapA, A, B) 
If check fails, abort 
11a. Check 
E′b=f3(DHkey1, Nb=Ne20, Na, ra, IOcapB, B, A) 
If check fails, abort 
9′. Compute E′a=f3(DHkey2, Na=Ne20, 
Nb, rb, IOcapA, A, B) and E′b=f3(DHkey1, 
Nb=Ne20, Na, ra, IOcapB, B, A) 
10′. E′a 
Phase 4 
12a. Compute LK1=f2(DHkey1, Na, 
Nb=Ne20, btlk, BD_ADDRa, 
BD_ADDRb) 
12b. Compute LK2=f2(DHkey2, Na= 
Ne20, Nb, btlk, BD_ADDRa, 
BD_ADDRb) 
12′. Compute LK1=f2(DHkey1, Na, 
Nb=Ne20, btlk, BD_ADDRa, 
BD_ADDRb) and LK2=f2(DHkey2, 










7a. Check if C′ai=f1(PKex, PKbx, Nei, rbi) 
If check fails, abort 
2a. Inject secret ra; Set rb=ra 2b. Inject secret rb; Set ra=rb 
3a. Select random Nai 3b. Select random Nbi 
4a. Compute commitment: 
Cai=f1(PKax, PKex, Nai, rai) 
Host 
4b. Compute commitment: 
Cbi=f1(PKbx, PKex, Nbi, rbi) 
8a. Check if C′bi=f1(PKex, PKax, Nei, rai) 
If check fails, abort 
Host 
3′. Select random Nei 
4′. Compute commitments: 
C′ai=f1(PKex, PKbx, Nei, rai) and 
C′bi=f1(PKex, PKax, Nei, rai) 
Steps 3-8 execute 20 times for authentication 
New random numbers are selected in each round 
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Step 1. Intercept the PKa and the PKb during the phase of public key exchange (step 1a 
and step 1b of Fig. 3). 
Step 2. During the phase of authentication stage 1, intercept the Cai (step 5 of Fig. 3) 
and the Nai (step 7 of Fig. 3) for all 1≤i≤20. 
Step 3. For each 1≤i≤20, compute C′ai=f1(PKax, PKbx, Nai, 0) and verify whether 
C′ai=Cai. If so, rai=0, else rai=1. 
Comments. 
(1) When the E passively observes a run of the passkey entry protocol, he can collect 
the PKa, the PKb, the Cai, and the Nai from the public channel and further deduce the ra 
offline. Therefore, once the host uses the ra again in another new SSP session, the E is 
able to exploit the MITM attack as Fig. 4. Clearly, if the host chooses another new 
passkey depended on the ra, the E still possibly derives the new one from the ra. 
(2) It needs to point out that Barnickel et al.’s attack [18] is similar to our offline 
attack. Barnickel et al.’s attack terminates the current SSP session of two devices and 
reuses the passkey in the next SSP session of two devices. However, our offline attack 
allows a successful SSP session of the pairing devices and exploits subsequent SSP 
sessions of them. Hence, our offline attack is not easily detected by the devices owner, 
compared with Barnickel et al.’s attack. 
3.2 Online attack on passkey 
In some situations, the host does not change the passkey until the SSP session is 
successful. The host may believe that the wireless communication errors or the related 
software flaws cause the failure of the Bluetooth pairing. If the host allows the failures in 
some degree, the attacker can make use of the online attack to determine the passkey. As 
shown in Fig. 5, the online attack applies the bit-by-bit strategy to determine the ra. Here, 
the attacker E interrupts the device A during the run of the passkey entry protocol. And, 
the E induces both devices, i.e., the A and the B, to start a new SSP session, if the current 
SSP session fails. To determine the rai for each 1≤i≤20, the online attack detail is 
described as follows. 
When the B generates the Nbi, the E also chooses his Nei (step 3b and step 3a′ in Fig. 
5). Then, the B computes the Cbi (step 4b in Fig. 5). At this time, if the rai is determined 
by the previous run of the protocol, the E computes his C′ai=f1(PKax, PKbx, Nei, rai) 
(step 4a′ in Fig. 5). Otherwise, the E computes his C′ai=f1(PKax, PKbx, Nei, 0) (also step 
4a′ in Fig. 5). Next, the E sends the C′ai and the Nei to the B (step 5′ and step 7′ in Fig. 
5). If the B terminates the run of the protocol (step 7a in Fig. 5), then the E knows that the 
rai is equal to 1 and induces the A to start a new SSP session with the B, else rai=0 when 
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the rai is an undetermined bit. Moreover, the E continues repeating above rule for the next 
bit of the ra, if the B does not terminate the current run of the protocol. 
To guess the ra, the E intercepts the PKax and the PKbx during the phase of public key 
exchange. Hence, the E can always compute the C′ai for the unknown rai and further get 
this rai based on the response of the B. In addition, the E is able to omit the Nbi, accept 
the correctness of the Cbi, and continuously determine the next unknown bit of the ra, if 
the B confirms the receiving C′ai from the E. 
 
Fig. 5 Online attack on the passkey entry protocol 
 
Let Pr(E) denote the probability that event E occurs. Let n and k be non-negative 








 is the number of different ways of 
choosing k distinct objects from a set of n distinct objects, where the order of choice is 
trivial. We further present the property of the online attack. 
Theorem 1 Let l be the number of the SSP sessions used in the online attack as Fig. 5. 








7a. Check if C′ai=f1(PKax, PKbx, Nei, rbi=rai) 
If check fails, abort 
2b. Inject secret rb; Set ra=rb 
3b. Select random Nbi 
Host 




3a′. Select random Nei 
4a′. Compute commitment: if rai has be 
determined before, then C′ai=f1(PKax, PKbx, Nei, 
rai), else C′ai=f1(PKax, PKbx, Nei, 0) 
7a′. If abort, rai=1 and abort 
If not abort and the rai is known, continue 
If not abort and the rai is unknown, rai=0 and 
continue 
Steps 3-8 execute at most 20 times for 
authentication 
































       (1) 
Proof. In the probability theory, it is well-known that the Bernoulli trial is an 
experiment with exactly two possible outcomes called success and failure. Obviously, the 
online passkey attack obeys the Bernoulli trial. That is, if the unknown bit rai is 0, then 
the outcome of the online passkey attack is treated as success and the attack continues for 
the next unknown bit of the ra, else the outcome of the attack is regarded as failure and 
the attacker E need induce the devices to start a new SSP session for the next unknown bit 
of the ra. Since the ra is treated as a random number with the 20-bit length, 
Pr(rai=0)=Pr(rai=1)=1/2 for each 1≤i≤20. It means that the failure probability p for 
guessing any rai is 1/2. According to the fact of the Bernoulli trial, the probability of 
exactly f failures in the sequence of n=20 such independent trials is 


























fffnf  for each 0≤f≤20. (2) 
We complete the proof and obtain the Eq. (1), since it needs to collect all probabilities of 
each exactly 0≤k≤l−1 failures case and the probability of the failures case when ra20=1 
and k=l.                                                               ▋ 



















































Therefore, we claim that the online attack can effectively recover the passkey. Note that 
the practical success probability for guessing the ra is bigger than the theory probability 
value computed by Eq. (1), because the ra in the Bluetooth standard is a random 6-digit 
number not a random 20-bit number. 
4 Countermeasure on Secure Simple Pairing 
4.1 Improved passkey entry protocol 
Barnickel et al. [18] gave two methods to remove the reusing passkey attacks in the 
passkey entry association model. The first method is that the user’s passkey should be 
verified by Bluetooth devices to be at least 20 bits with one as the most significant bit and 
the devices do not accept the same passkey twice. The second method is that the devices 
respectively use the DHkey to encrypt the Nai and the Nbi and then instead exchange 
them during step 7 and step 8 in Fig. 3. We argue that Barnickel et al.’s methods are 
impractical. The first method requires the devices permanently and securely to record all 
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previous passkeys of the SSP sessions. The implementation costs of this requirement are 
quite expensive for the devices. In addition, the users may feel the inconvenience, 
because the same passkey is not allowed. The second method is still vulnerable to the 
similar online attack in Section 3.2, if the attacker E shares the Diffie-Hellman key with 
the device B during the phase of public key exchange. In fact, as described in Fig. 4, the 
E can exploit the MITM attack to establish the shared DHkey2 with the B. Therefore, to 
overcome the weaknesses of the reusing passkey, we improve the passkey entry protocol 
as follows. 
 
Fig. 6 Improved passkey entry protocol 
 
After the passkey is injected into two devices (step 2a and step 2b in Fig. 6), the device 
A and the device B respectively generate the random nonce Na0 and the random nonce 
Nb0 (step 2c and step 2d in Fig. 6). The A and the B then exchange the Na0 and the Nb0 
Execute 20 times 













2a. Inject secret ra; Set rb=ra 
2c. Select random Na0 
2b. Inject secret rb; Set ra=rb 
2d. Select random Nb0 
5a. Select random Nai 5b. Select random Nbi 
6a. Compute commitment: Cai=f1(PKax, 
PKbx, Nai, r*ai) 
Host 
6b. Compute commitment: Cbi=f1(PKbx, 
PKax, Nbi, r*bi) 
3. Na0 
4a. Compute r=f2(DHkey, Na0, Nb0, ra) and 
set 6 most significant digits of r to r*a 
4b. Compute r=f2(DHkey, Na0, Nb0, rb) and 
set 6 most significant digits of r to r*b 
4. Nb0 
9a. Check if Cai=f1(PKax, PKbx, Nai, r*bi) 
If check fails, abort 
10a. Check if Cbi=f1(PKbx, PKax, Nbi, r*ai) 
If check fails, abort 
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(step 3 and step 4 in Fig. 6). The A computes r=f2(DHkey, Na0, Nb0, ra) and sets the r*a 
using the 6 most significant digits of the r (step 4a in Fig. 6). Similarly, the B computes 
r=f2(DHkey, Na0, Nb0, rb) and sets the r*b using the 6 most significant digits of the r 
(step 4b in Fig. 6). The steps 5 through 10 in improved passkey entry protocol are same 
as the steps 3 through 8 in original passkey entry protocol (Fig. 3), except that the r*a and 
the r*b respectively take place of the ra and the rb. 
4.2 Security analysis of improved passkey entry protocol 
In our attacks on the passkey entry association model, it shows that the attacker takes 
advantage of the run(s) of the passkey entry protocol to derive host’s passkey ra. Then, 
the attacker is able to launch his MITM attack, once the host injects the ra again. Based 
on this observation, our countermeasure avoids directly using the ra for the device 
authentication. Instead, the ra is regarded as a seed of the authentication passkey r during 
the run of the passkey entry protocol. Moreover, the countermeasure uses the shared 
secret key DHkey and the cryptographic hash function f2() to guarantee against guessing 
the ra from the authentication passkey r. At the same time, the countermeasure applies the 
nonce Na0 from the device A and the nonce Nb0 from the device B to randomly update 
the authentication passkey r at each run of the passkey entry protocol. In the following, 
we analyze the security of improved passkey entry protocol in more details. 
Case 1 (Concern on offline passkey attack). In fact, the improved passkey entry 
protocol maintains the same device authentication scheme as that of original passkey 
entry protocol. That is, the A and the B take turns revealing their commitments Cai and 
Cbi until the entire ra has been mutually disclosed. Hence, for the attacker E using similar 
offline passkey attack in Section 3.1, the entire r*a still is available after a complete run 
of improved passkey entry protocol. But, the r*a is only the 6 most significant digits of 
the r, where r=f2(DHkey, Na0, Nb0, ra). The E must compromise the ra for launching the 
MITM attack in the subsequent SSP sessions. It means that the E needs to compute the ra, 
given the Na0, the Nb0, the r*a, and the f2(). Assume that the f2() is a cryptographic one-
way hash function with local one-wayness property [23]. The local one-wayness property 
means that the E should be difficult to find the remainder input of the f2(), even if part of 
the input of the f2() is known. For example, if t input bits remain unknown, it should take 
on average 2
t−1
 cryptographic hash operations to find these bits. We claim that the 
improved passkey entry protocol prevents the offline attack in Section 3.1, when the f2() 
maintains the local one-wayness property. That is to say, the E is impossible to reveal the 
ra from the Na0, the Nb0, the r*a, and the f2(), because the unknown inputs of the f2(), 
i.e., the DHkey and the ra, are large enough. Obviously, our claim also fits to the case that 
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the E collects a group of the Na0, the Nb0, and the r*a from several runs of improved 
passkey entry protocol and attempts to compute the unique ra based on the f2(). 
Case 2 (Concern on online passkey attack). As described in Fig. 4, the E can establish 
the DHkey2 shared with the device B, when the phase of public key exchange is finished. 
Let us consider the E impersonates the A to generate and send his own random Ne0 
instead of the Na0 in the run of improved passkey entry protocol. One choice of the E is 
to simply apply the similar online attack in Section 3.2. Clearly, the E directly guesses the 
correct 6-digt number r*a with the probability 10
−6
. If any run of the improved passkey 
entry protocol fails due to the wrong guess of any bit r*ai for 1≤i≤20, the B should 
generate a new Nb0, compute another r=f2(DHkey2, Ne0, Nb0, ra), and reset the 6 most 
significant digits of the new r to the r*a in the next SSP session. Hence, when the E 
mounts on the similar online attack in Section 3.2, his success probability should be 10
−6
. 
This success probability satisfies the requirement of the Bluetooth standard specification 
[10]. The other choice is that the E controls his Ne0 (step 3 of Fig. 6) and receives the 
Nb0 from the B (step 4 of Fig. 6), and then further deduces the 6 most significant digits of 
the r for the device authentication. In this case, the E need predict the 6 most significant 
digits of the r such that r=f2(DHkey2, Ne0, Nb0, ra), providing that the ra is unknown and 
the Nb0 are randomly generated by the B. This success probability also is 10
−6
, because 
the f2() has the uniform random distribution property [23]. Note that if the E does not 
share the DHkey2 with the B, the success probability of launching MITM attack should 
not be over 10
−6
. The reason is that the E faces the unknown Diffie-Hellman key but the 
states of other parameters are unchanged. 
As a result, the improved passkey entry protocol overcomes the reusing passkey 
weaknesses on the original passkey entry protocol. In essence, the secret DHkey added to 
the ra amplifies the size of the passkey space. Simultaneously, the Na0, the Nb0, and the 
f2() randomize the r and the r*a for the device authentication. This is the trick behind the 
improved protocol. 
4.3 Performance analysis of improved passkey entry protocol 
The improved passkey entry protocol for SSP aims to deploy in different Bluetooth 
devices and potentially implement in the service level of Bluetooth network systems. 
Hence, we need carefully evaluate the protocol performance. To be fair, we compare the 
improved passkey entry protocol with the original passkey entry protocol [10] and 
Barnickel et al.’s encrypting nonce protocol [18]. The reason is that these protocols are 
designed for the same security goals of the Bluetooth device and make use of similar 
basic cryptographic components. 
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In the implementation complexity concern, the improved protocol requires the random 
number generator to generate the Nai and the Nbi for each 0≤i≤20, the f2() to derive the 
authentication passkey r, and the f1() to compute and check the Cai and the Cbi for each 
1≤i≤20. Comparatively, the original protocol needs the random number generator to 
generate the Nai and the Nbi for each 1≤i≤20 and the f1() to compute and check the Cai 
and the Cbi for each 1≤i≤20. Note that the original protocol also requires the f2() during 
the phase of link key calculation. It means that the implementation complexity for the 
improved protocol and the original protocol is same in view of the whole SSP session. 
However, besides the random number generator and the f1(), Barnickel et al.’s protocol 
needs extra encryption function to encrypt the Nai and the Nbi for each 1≤i≤20. 
Therefore, the implementation complexity of Barnickel et al.’s protocol is higher than 
that of the improved protocol and the original protocol. 
As for the communication cost, the improved protocol requires 82 message interactions 
to finish a run, compared with 80 message interactions in the original protocol. Moreover, 
the improved protocol need exchange the Na0, the Nb0, the Nai, the Nbi, the Cai, and the 
Cbi for each 1≤i≤20, while the original protocol requires exchanging the Nai, the Nbi, the 
Cai, and the Cbi for each 1≤i≤20. Let the Na0 and the Nb0 all be 128 bits. We know that 
the Nai, the Nbi, the Cai, and the Cbi for each 1≤i≤20 are all 128 bits. Thus, the 
communication cost of a run is 128×82=10496 bits for the improved protocol and 
128×80=10240 bits for the original protocol. The communication cost of a run of 
Barnickel et al.’s protocol is also 10240 bits, because it merely uses the encrypted nonces 
to take place of the nonces in the original protocol and those data should have the same 
bit length. 
Consider the computation cost for a run of the protocol. The improved protocol needs 2 
cryptographic hash computations of the f2() to derive the authentication passkey r and 80 
cryptographic hash computations of the f1() to generate and check the Cai and the Cbi for 
each 1≤i≤20. We omit the setting operations for the r*a and the r*b in the improved 
protocol, because the setting operation is trivial, compared with the cryptographic hash 
computation. By contrast, the original protocol needs 80 cryptographic hash computations 
of the f1() for processing the Cai and the Cbi for each 1≤i≤20. However, Barnickel et al.’s 
protocol requires not only 80 cryptographic hash computations of the f1() for the Cai and 
the Cbi for each 1≤i≤20 but also 40 encryption nonce computations and 40 decryption 
nonce computations. 
For the storage cost, we only consider the long-standing secret values existed in all 
phases of the SSP session. Clearly, three protocols all require storing the long-standing 
DHkey. That is, these protocols cost same storage resource. 
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For comparison purpose, we regard the performance values of the original protocol as 
the baseline and define the increasing ratio of the communication cost as 
1
protocol original  theofcost ion communicat the
protocol target  theofcost ion communicat the
P
ioncommunicat
−=                  (3) 
and the increasing ratio of the computation cost as 
1
protocol original  theofcost n computatio the
protocol target  theofcost n computatio the
P
ncomputatio
−= .                    (4) 
In Table 1, we summarize the performance results of the improved protocol, the original 
protocol, and Barnickel et al.’s protocol. Here, we assume that the overheads of the 
encryption or decryption nonce computation are close to those of the cryptographic hash 
computation. It shows that the total implementation costs of the improved protocol are 
nearly to those of the original protocol. This is a desirable feature, when the improved 
protocol fits into the Bluetooth standard. However, the computation cost of Barnickel et 
al.’s protocol is higher than that of the other two protocols. 
 
Table 1 Performance comparison among the related protocols 
Performance index Our improved protocol Original protocol Barnickel et al.’s protocol 
Implementation complexity Medium Medium High 
Communication cost 10496 bits 10240 bits 10240 bits 
Pcommunication 2.5% 0 0 
Computation cost 82 H 
a 80 H 80 H+40 E b+40 D c≈160 H 
Pcomputation 2.5% 0 100% 
Storage cost 192 or 256 bits 192 or 256 bits 192 or 256 bits 
a. H denotes the cryptographic hash computation 
b. E denotes the encryption nonce computation 
c. D denotes the decryption nonce computation 
 
4.4 Home network application of improved passkey entry protocol 
Due to readily available and low-cost feature, an increasing number of Bluetooth devices 
are connected to the home network according to the Bluetooth standard [9, 10]. In the 
home network environment, Bluetooth services usually provide the efficient and massive 
data transmission among the pairing Bluetooth devices. The transmitting data include the 
text, the picture, the audio, the automation, and the video. The home network should 
ensure the trusted and uncompromised Bluetooth devices and the corresponding 
Bluetooth services. The SSP mechanism in the Bluetooth standard is responsible for this 
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task. In addition, when we build a secure home network system, the SSP mechanism also 
is the backbone of the Bluetooth solution to cooperate with other kinds of secure schemes 
[24–29]. 
Under the home network environments, Bluetooth devices are identifiable and 
trustable, because they always belong to the home members. Since Phan-Mingard’s 
MITM attack [17] uses the outside device, it is not regarded as a serious threat for SSP 
under the passkey entry association model. That is to say, the home member would be 
cautious, when he finds that the unfamiliar Bluetooth device tries to pair his Bluetooth 
device. By contrast, our proposed MITM attacks are destructive in the case of the home 
network, because they all run in an undetected manner. The malicious visitor can take his 
Bluetooth device to intercept the legal SSP session of the passkey entry association 
model, collect the PKa, the PKb, the Cai, and the Nai, and launch the offline attack on the 
corresponding passkey (Section 3.1). Alternatively, the malicious visitor’s Bluetooth 
device can hijack the legal SSP session of the passkey entry association model and 
directly guess the passkey online (Section 3.2). When the home member uses the 
compromised passkey again, the MITM attack (Fig. 4) should be successful and the 
malicious visitor may disclose the sensitive information stored in the pairing Bluetooth 
devices. Unfortunately, the home member does not detect any abnormal state from his 
pairing Bluetooth devices. The reason is that malicious visitor’s Bluetooth device never 
explicitly takes part in any SSP session. 
Note that the home members are perhaps apt to sharing and reusing the passkey. In 
fact, a constant passkey is convenient to smooth the run of the SSP sessions among 
Bluetooth devices from the different home members. But, the attacker may exploit this 
point to launch our MITM attacks. For this reason, the improved passkey entry protocol is 
designed to prevent the MITM attacks, even if the home members share and reuse their 
passkey. Therefore, compared with the original passkey entry protocol, the improved 
passkey entry protocol is more suitable for the home network applications. 
5 Conclusions 
Bluetooth devices are widely employed in the home network systems. It is important to 
secure those Bluetooth devices, because they always store and transmit personal sensitive 
information. In the Bluetooth standard, SSP is an essential security mechanism for 
Bluetooth devices. Our study dedicates to the MITM attacks on SSP under the passkey 
entry association model and the corresponding countermeasure. We demonstrated that the 
MITM attacks are possible, when the host reuses the passkey or the device uses 
nonrandom passkey generation algorithm in the passkey entry association model. We 
further improved the passkey entry protocol to prevent the MITM attacks on the passkey 
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entry association model. The improved protocol can be easily adapted to the Bluetooth 
standard, because it only employs the basic cryptographic components existed in the 
Bluetooth standard. Moreover, the improved protocol only increases one round message 
exchange between the pairing Bluetooth devices and one hash computation for each of 
them, compared with the original protocol. Hence, the additional implementation cost is 
insignificant. 
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